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The emergence of biotechnology, the science of creating new organisms
with useful and commercially viable applications, has thrown traditional
conceptions of patent law into turmoil.' In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,2 the United
States Supreme Court broadened the concept of patent protection to include
inventions derived from biological advances, holding that genetically altered
living microorganisms constituted patentable subject matter.3 This marriage of
biotechnological inventions and patent law is not a happy one. Biotechnology
distinguishes itself from the traditional mechanical and chemical arts that
undergird patent law doctrines. Self-replicating biotechnological inventions pose
unique problems, not only because the product duplicates itself for competitors
as well as for consumers, but because the concept of patenting a living creature
cuts against patent law's mechanically based norms. Moreover, the puzzle of
distinguishing the man-made from the natural challenges the definitions that
both patent doctrine and traditional science impose on the resulting organisms.4
As more biotechnological inventions mature into marketable products,5
1. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 107 (D. Mass. 1989) ("Developments
in biotechnology ... have challenged the traditional norms of patent law.") (citation omitted).
2. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
3. Prior to Diamond, the Court in Funk Bros. Seeds Co. v. Kao Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948),
found that an inventor's mixture of bacterial strains, that is living matter, was not within any of the statutory
categories of subject matter eligible for patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Diamond Court, however, held
that a man-made, genetically engineered bacterium was patentable. The Diamond Court distinguished Funk:
There, the patentee had discovered that there existed in nature certain species of root-nodule
bacteria which did not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other.... Here, by contrast,
the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found
in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.
447 U.S. at 310.
4. Thus far, much of the debate revolves around the requirements an inventor must satisfy before he
can obtain a patent. These issues include satisfying the § 101 requirements for subject matter patentability,
the disclosure requirements for biotechnology inventions, depository requirements of microorganisms, and
the nonobviousness requirement. See, e.g., Stephen A. Bent, Patent Protection for DNA Molecules, 64 J.
PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 60 (1982); Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the
Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1991); Sean Johnston, Patent Protection for the
Protein Products of Recombinant DNA, 4 HIGH TECH. LJ. 249 (1990); Kate H. Murashige, Section 1021103
Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prosecution, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASs'N. QJ. 295 (1988-89).
5. Human insulin was the first pharmaceutical produced through recombinant DNA technology, approved
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and marketed. FDA approval came in October 1982 and
commercial sales began shortly thereafter. Irving S. Johnson, Human Insulin from Recombinant DNA
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commercial conflicts over the problem of defining such products in traditional
terms have increased. Courts, however, have consistently applied traditional
patent doctrines to resolve biotechnology infringement suits. 6 The courts'
decisions in these cases have intensified the debate on whether patent law
adequately protects biotechnology patents so as to encourage growth and research
in the biotechnology industry.
7
The most important issue in this debate is determining the patent's proper
scope. Under U.S. law, a patent guarantees the holder a monopoly in the product
for seventeen years! The economic power a patent confers depends on its scope.
The broader the scope, the wider the market within which the patent holder can
exercise monopoly power. Broader scope confers power to exclude a greater
range of competing products and processes from the market.9 Since scope
determines the extent to which the patent holder may exclusively exploit or
improve products and processes, scope determination decisively impacts the
progress of biotechnology.
Two recent cases, Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech,
Inc.1° and Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation, Ltd., 1 illustrate the
conflicting interests involved in determining biotechnology patent scope. The
Technology, 219 SCIENCE 632 (1983); As Lilly's Synthetic Insidin Gets FDA OKNovo, Biogen Join to Clone
Their Own, MCGRAW-HILL'S BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWsWATCH, Nov. 15, 1982, at 2.
6. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 947 (1987); Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363 (BNA) (D. Del. 1990);
Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (summary judgment
of noninfringement granted), aff d in part, vacated in part, 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed,
59 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1991) (No. 90-1052); Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co.,
Case No. R86-3132 (D. Md. 1988); Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (BNA) (C.D. Cal.
1987) (on motion for preliminary injunction), aft'd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal.
1988), modified 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), modified 724 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
7. Unsatisfied with the way courts are applying traditional doctrines to biotechnology patents, biotech
interest groups began an intensive lobbying effort to make patent statutes accommodate biotechnology
inventions. This effort resulted in congressional bills in 1990 and 199 1, both of which attempted to strengthen
patent protection for biotechnology-derived products and processes. See Biotechnology Patent Protection
Act of 1991, H.R. 1417, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation
Act, H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990); Process Patent Amendments of 1990, H.R. 5664, 101st Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1990); S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see also 137 CONG. REC. E946 (daily ed. Mar. 14,
1991) (statement of Rep. Boucher); 137 CONG. REC. S3284-86 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); 136 CONG. REC. S3107-08 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 136 CoNG.
REC. E213-14 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boucher). For a more complete discussion of this
proposed legislation, see David Beier & Robert H. Benson, Biotechnology Patent Protection Act, 68 DENV.
U. L. REV. 173, 184-90 (1991).
8. A United States patent confers to the patentee an exclusive right to make, use, and sell the invention
in the United States for seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
9. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On The Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 839 (1990).
10. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified, 707
F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), modified, 724 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
11. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363 (BNA) (D. Del. 1990).
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Scripps court found that a patent teaching12 how to isolate and extract a protein
from natural products is infringed when other researchers construct the same
protein using DNA recombinant techniques. The Wellcome court held that a
second generation recombinant protein with many improvements over the first
generation protein infringed the patent on the first generation protein. Both courts
gave strong protection to the patented inventions. In so doing, however, they
may have dampened incentives for others to create recombinant products and
to make improvements on existing products.
Commentators disagreee as to whether courts in such cases have given
biotechnology inventions the proper degree of protection. However, much of
the debate thus far has focused on whether courts either failed to apply or
erroneously applied the traditional patent doctrines. 3 This approach to the
question of proper scope is incomplete, and perhaps misguided. Patent awards
derive from the notion that patent monopoly promotes technological
advancement.1 4 This Note explores that notion by examining the economic
incentives created by different scope "sizes" through four economic theories
about how patents promote technological advancement. Within this framework,
the Note inquires whether traditional patent law should apply to the unique
features of biotechnology. This Note does not argue for a blanket rule dictating
the proper patent scope, because scope determination depends heavily on the
facts of each case and the language of each patent. Nonetheless, the Note seeks
to reveal important factors for scope determination, factors that create economic
incentives aligned with promoting progress in biotechnology.
Part I of the Note defines patent scope and explains its significance for
technological progress. Part H examines biotechnology's unique features and
then clarifies the interests at stake when courts determine the scope of a
biotechnology patent. Finally, Part III introduces four economic theories and
analyzes how courts' decisions pursuant to these theories may promote progress
in biotechnology.
I. THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF PATENT SCOPE
A. Defining Scope
The scope of a patent is the range of products or processes for which the
patent holder has the right to "exclude others from making, using, or selling
the invention."15 Patent claims measure and define scope.16 Claim interpre-
12. '"eaching" is a term of art in patent law. A patent "teaches" the information or knowledge that
it discloses.
13. See, e.g., Robert L. Baechtold et al., Property Rights in Living Matter: Is New Law Required?, 68
DENV. U. L. REV. 141 (1991); Burk, supra note 4, at 64-69.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
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tation is a question of law. 7 To determine the proper scope of a claim, a court
must consider the language of the claim not in isolation, but rather in the context
of the patent reference" as a whole. 9 Courts must refer to the specification
disclosures, both for the meaning of particular terms used by the claim20 and
for an understanding of the invention actually patented. The Supreme Court
outlined this relationship between the specification and the claim:
While the claims of a patent limit the invention, and specifications
cannot be utilized to expand the patent monopoly, it is fundamental
that claims are to be construed in the light of the specifications and
both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention.2'
The patent holder's exclusive right to exploit products or processes within
the scope of his patent grants him economic power. If the patent holder believes
others are exploiting products or processes within the scope of his patent, he
may sue for infringement. Courts analyze infringement in three steps. First, courts
examine the claims, as described above, to ascertain the scope of a patent.
"Literal" infringement results if the alleged infringing matter falls within the
scope of the claims as properly construed.' Even if an accused product or
process does not literally infringe the claim, it may still infringe under the
"doctrine of equivalents."'a Under this judicially created doctrine, a product
or process, though it does not fall within the literal language of the patent claims,
may infringe if it "performs substantially the same overall function or work,
in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same overall result
16. A patent has two required parts: specification and claims. The specification contains a discussion
of the invention's background, a summary of the invention, and a detailed description of at least one
embodiment of the invention. The embodiment must be described in sufficient detail "to enable any person
skilled in the art to which [the invention] pertains ... to make and use [the invention]." 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1988). Claims usually encompass much more than this, but they must describe only what is new, without
including anything that is already in the public domain. Id.
17. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
18. A patentreference includes the specification, prosecution history, and other claims in the same patent.
Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Prosecution history is the record kept by the
Patent and Trademark Office which includes the initial patent application, all official actions mailed by the
Patent Examiner, all responses made by the patent applicant, modifications of the initial patent application,
and the final version of the patent allowed by the Examiner. IVER P. COOPER, 1 BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW § 5A.05, at 5A-19 (1991).
19. Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 E2d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027
(1988); Moeller, 794 F.2d at 656.
20. Fonar Corp., 821 F.2d at 632; Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 644 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
21. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1966) (citations omitted).
22. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
23. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Courts use
this doctrine to try to make an equitable delineation of patent scope. In effect, courts will ignore the letter
of a broad patent claim or read greater breadth into a narrowly drafted patent claim in order to achieve a
just result. Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts - Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 608, 631 (1988).
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as the claimed invention."' However, this doctrine cuts both ways. Under the
"reverse" doctrine of equivalents, even if an accused product or process "falls
within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used
to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for infringement." 26 This
happens if the accused product or process is "so far changed in principle from
a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially
different way."27
Patent scope defines the extent to which the patent holder can exclude other
inventors from exploring and exploiting variations or improvements of the
patented invention. While courts should not necessarily limit a claim to the
embodiments disclosed by the specification, the degree to which the scope should
extend beyond the disclosed embodiments is uncertain. For guidance on this
question courts turn to a complex body of traditional patent doctrines concerning
claim interpretation and infringement. 28
B. Economic Implications of Scope Determination
What defines proper patent scope depends on the goals of the patent system.
The Constitution mandates "securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective... Discoveries," in order "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."29 Pursuant to this grant of power,
Congress enacts patent legislation for the specific purpose of promoting scientific
progress. To implement this goal, Congress and the courts award monopolies
to inventors who, in return, must explain their inventions in their patent
applications. Thus, in theory, a patent confers a monopoly for a limited time
in exchange for an inventor's public disclosure that ensures-again, in
theory-widespread diffusion of benefits once the patent expires.
Determining the scope of a patent's monopoly power is a special case of
property rights allocation, a general problem that concerns the distribution of
rights in property among parties in order to promote the most efficient use of
that property. In the context of patents, the property in question is the opportunity
to appropriate returns and make improvements on inventions within the scope
24. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 961 (1988), and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); see also, Graver Tank v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
339 U.S. 605 (1950).
25. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en bane) ("The
law also acknowledges that one may only appear to have appropriated the patented contribution, when a
product precisely described in a patent claim is in fact 'so far changed in principle' that it performs in a
'substantially different way' and is not therefore an appropriation (reverse doctrine of equivalents).") (emphasis
omitted).
26. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09.
27. Id. at 608.
28. And yet, "the legal principles and objective evidence often leave considerable room for discretion"
to the courts. Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 841.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
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of the patent. Imagine dividing the entire field of biotechnology among a number
of inventors. Each patent would allocate to each patentee a segment of the field
within which to make, use, or sell improvements. The Coasian theory of property
allocation suggests that parties will bargain to a Pareto-superior solution no
matter how entitlements are initially assigned. Therefore, the "size" of the rights
should affect only the individual parties' personal gain, not the overall efficiency
of the allocation in benefiting society.30 In the patent context, the Coasian
theory implies that the scope of patents has no impact upon technological and
scientific progress.
However, empirical studies of the Coasian theory have shown that the initial
distribution of property rights can alter the bargaining parties' equilibrium level
of output.31 A substantial literature documents the steep transaction costs of
technology licensing. 2 In addition, indirect evidence suggests that the transfer
of major improvements increases these costs. 33 Such studies demonstrate that
the size of patent scope affects development in biotechnology.
Economic literature has not focused on how patent scope affects technologi-
cal advances, with the exception of an article by Robert P. Merges and Richard
R. Nelson entitled On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope.' Through the
use of historical studies, the authors contend that the courts' grant of broad patent
scope to important inventions has slowed progress in several industries.35 The
authors encourage the courts to exercise their discretion to narrow patent scope
whenever the traditional patent doctrines so allow.36 In addition, the authors
find that patent scope affects progress in each industry differently depending
upon the nature of the technology involved, the manner in which technical
30. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REV. 347, 359 (1967)
(discussing bargaining process by using example of patents); see also LeeG. Anderson, Conceptual Constructs
for Practical ITQ Management Policies, in RIGHTS BASED FISHING 191, 196 (Phillip A. Neher et al. eds.,
1989) (concluding that market for randomly allocated, individual, transferable quotas would lead to efficient
allocation via trading among firms). See generally, Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960).
31. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 105 n.15 (1988); Mark Keiman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979);
Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 884-909 (tracing history of technological development in various industries
and demonstrating effect of patent scope on the development of those industries).
32. See, e.g., FAROK J. CONTRACrOR, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LIcENSING: COMPESATION, COSTS,
AND NEGOTIATION 104-05 (1981) (calculating the transaction costs in licensing deals studied); DAVID .
TEEcE, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE REsOURCE COST OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER 44 (1976) (indicating that transfer costs constitute over 19% of total project costs in international
projects studied).
33. Transaction costs such as possible opportunistic behavior are described in David Teece, Profiting
from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy,
15 RE. POL'Y 285, 294 (1986).
34. Merges & Nelson, supra note 9. Another exception is D. G. McFetridge & M. Rafiquzzaman, The
Scope and Duration of the Patent Right and the Nature of Research Rivalry, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 91 (1986).
35. Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 897.
36. Id. at 841, 843-44 ("f]he legal principles and objective evidence often leave considerable room
for discretion .... [T]he law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for
improvements, rather than an environment dominated by the pioneer firm.").
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advances in the industry relate to each other, and the extent to which firms
license technologies to each other.37
II. THE STAKE IN DISPUTES OVER BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT SCOPE
Two recent cases, Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech,
Inc.38 and Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd.,39 illustrate the
conflicting interests involved when courts determine the scope of a patent in
a biotechnology infringement suit. Because the unique nature of biotechnological
science complicates legal determinations of biotechnology patent scope, this
Part surveys the history and certain techniques of biotechnology before
considering the interests at stake in biotechnology patent cases.
A. The History of Biotechnology
Biotechnology is the science of manipulating and modifying the genetic
make-up of living matter. Although humans have employed microorganisms
for thousands of years in brewing and baking, and have manipulated genetic
material through selective breeding of plants and livestock, only in the last
twenty-five years have humans managed to manipulate and alter biological matter
at the cellular and molecular levels. In 1973, Professors Stanley N. Cohen and
Herbert W. Boyer invented the basic technique for creating recombinant DNA.4
They demonstrated how to cut a gene from the DNA41 of one organism,42
recombine it in vitro with DNA of a host organism,43 and re-introduce 4 the
recombinant gene into the cells of the host organism to confer the gene's
characteristic trait on the host organism 5 Insulin, the earliest achievement of
37. Id. at 843.
38. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified 707
F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), modified 724 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
39. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363 (BNA) (D. Del. 1990).
40. See Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro,
70 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA 3240 (1973).
41. DNA guides cellular synthesis of proteins. See, e.g., JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT
DNA: A SHORT COURSE 1 (1983). DNA is an enormous, long molecule comprised of subunits called
nucleotides. Certain sections of DNA, called genes, contain the "blueprint" for proteins encoded in their
nucleotide sequence. There is a correspondence between DNA nucleotide sequence and protein amino acid
sequences: the order of nucleotides in each gene corresponds to the amino acid sequences of a particular
protein. Id. at 32-33.
42. Special proteins called restriction enzymes that recognize certain sequences in DNA cut the DNA
strand at appropriate points. Id. at 61.
43. Enzymes called ligase reconnect severed DNA strands. Id. at 65.
44. This process is accomplished by way of a vector, which is a DNA molecule that can be moved
between cells and is functional in different cells. Common types of vectors are plasmids (circular pieces
of DNA often exchanged by bacteria) and viruses.
45. The following United States patents have been issued to Cohen and Boyer on their process for
producing biologically functional molecular chimeras: U.S. Patent No. 4,740,470 (April 26, 1988); U.S. Patent
No. 4,468, 464 (Aug. 28, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (Dec. 2, 1980).
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recombinant DNA technology, derives naturally from human pancreas cells,
cells that cannot be cultured 6 Until the advent of recombinant technology,
diabetics received insulin extracted from the pancreas of a cow or a pig. Using
recombinant DNA technology, a biotechnician cuts the insulin gene from human
DNA, splices it into a plasmid,47 and introduces the altered plasmid into a
microbe to create a microbe capable of manufacturing insulin. Through this
process, scientists can now culture insulin-producing microbes cheaply and
efficiently on a large scale.
Other early successes of recombinant technology include several types of
interferon for the treatment of cancer and leukemia, human growth hormones
for the treatment of pituitary dwarfs, tissue plasminogen activators-natural
proteolytic enzymes-used for the dissolution of blood clots, and hepatitis B
sub-unit vaccine.48 Recombinant DNA technology can reduce the production
cost and increase the supply of many materials now used in medicine,
agriculture, and industry.
4 9
B. Inventing a Recombinant Protein
A research project typically begins with the discovery that a particular
protein5° performs some desirable function. To understand how this protein
functions, scientists must extract the desired protein from a natural source.
Isolating the gene that expresses this protein and placing that gene in a suitable
environment enables the production of the protein in large quantities. The process
of extraction and purification can prove technically difficult, making the decision
to research recombinant techniques contingent on the availability of large
quantities of the protein from natural resources.5'
The process of recombinant DNA protein production involves a high degree
of randomness at several stages. First, isolating the desired protein in sufficient
quantities and purity from a mixture containing vast numbers of protein remains
extremely complicated. Second, and more importantly, the search for the human
gene that expresses the desired protein begins by using a complementary
46. Insulin is a human hormone that coordinates the activities of individual cells and tissues in order
to maintain the correct amount of sugar in the bloodstream. Some types of diabetes can be treated by supplying
patients with extra insulin. See, e.g., KENT M. VAN DE GRAAFF, HUMAN ANATOMY 426-27 (2d ed. 1988).
47. A plasmid is a circular DNA molecule that replicates in a host cell, independent of the host cell's
genes.
48. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY: ECONOMIC
AND WIDER IMPACrS 23 (1989); see also Phillip B. C. Jones, Patentability of the Products and Processes
of Biotechnology, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 372 (1991).
49. See STEVE PRENTs, BIOTECHNOLOGY: A NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 72-128(1984) (discussing
diverse applications of biotechnology to medical uses and agriculture). See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, CONGRESSIONAL BOARD OF THE 98TH CONG., COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (1984).
50. Proteins are long, folded chains of chemical subunits called amino acids.
51. OFFICE OFTEcHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 49, at 119-36 (illustrating scientific and commercial
developments of several protein products).
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construct, chosen somewhat at random, to probe a DNA library.52 The probe
may be a DNA fragment from another animal species or a synthetic construct
from the amino acid sequence of the naturally-derived protein. The process
becomes complex because a given amino acid may correspond to two or more
different DNA codons."3 Synthetically constructing all of the possible gene
variations that encode for a specified amino acid sequence can thus be a
formidable job. Using a probe to isolate a specific gene compares unfavorably
to searching for a needle in a haystack. Because of the variety and complexity
of the DNA in living cells, isolating a single gene requires isolating a specific
sequence of hundreds or thousands of nucleotides from among several billion.5 4
With a gene isolated through this process, the researcher may explore ways
to modify the codon sequence to produce a protein with one or more variations
in its amino acid structure. These new proteins, known as "second generation,"
contain variations that may enhance potency, resistance to degradation, or other
desirable qualities. Variations in the physical shape of each protein allow it to
interact selectively with complementary surfaces of other molecules, meshing
much like gears in a machine, to perform various cellular functions. This physical
shape derives from the sequence of amino acids in the protein chain."
With present techniques, however, the physical configuration of a protein
remains unpredictable even when the entire amino acid sequence of the protein
is known." Nonetheless, one can analyze the probability that a protein's amino
acid sequence forms a particular configuration. For example, homologous
sequences 57 function similarly more often than do unrelated sequences.
However, a single amino acid change at a critical locus can dramatically alter
the shape of the protein, nullifying the protein's original function or creating
an entirely new function5 Because this relationship between structure and
function remains unpredictable, creating an improved second generation protein
may be as daunting a task as producing the first generation recombinant protein.
52. A "DNA library" is a genomic library containing a complete set of human genes.
53. Each nucleotide contains a phosphate group linked to a sugar molecule, which in turn, is linked
to one of the following chemicals called "nucleotide bases": adenine (A), thymine (T), guanine (G), or cytosine
(C). A cell's protein synthesis machinery "reads" the sequence of nucleotide bases in groups of three, called
"codons." Each codon corresponds to an amino acid, and more than one codon may correspond to the same
amino acid.
54. JAMES WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 86-88 (4th ed. 1987).Thedifficulty
of identifying and isolating the gene for a desired protein results from the complexity of the natural
environment in which genes and proteins are found; DNA in each human cell consists of a total of about
3 billion nucleotide base pairs, organized into 100,000 or more individual genes. See generally WATSON
FT AL., supra note 41.
55. See, e.g., LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 37-39 (3d ed. 1988); Jennifer Van Brunt, Beta Barrels,
Helix Bundles, Hairpin Turns, and Pleated Sheets, 6 BIOI'ECH. 655 (1988).
56. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 97-100 (2d ed. 1989); Klaus Kauza
et al., Oligonucleotide-directed Mutagenesis of the Rhizobium japonicum nift Promotor, 188 FED'N OF EUR.
BIOCHEM. Soc'Y LETTERS 37, 41 (1985); Van Brunt, supra note 55, at 655.
57. Homologous sequences have identical mutations or genes in.a genetic map and are identical in their
visible structure.
58. See, e.g., Van Brunt, supra note 55, at 656-61.
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Adding to the randomness and consequent risky nature of the biotech-
nological invention process, the basic research involved in isolating, character-
izing, and expressing particular genes consumes huge amounts of time and
money.59 Moreover, the industrial scale-up for manufacture of biotechnological
products poses formidable obstacles to reproducing a laboratory's precisely
controlled environment on a factory floor.6° Such technical obstacles have
increased development times and costs for most biotechnological products.61
Technical and financial impediments combine with stringent regulatory
requirements to demand an average of $240 million and more than ten years
to bring a recombinant product to market.62
C. Proteins Isolated from Natural Sources Versus Those Made with
Recombinant Technology
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., Scripps charged
Genentech with infringement of its patent on Factor VIII:C, a protein that
activates the blood clotting mechanism.63 The lawsuit underscored the problems
faced by an industry built around innovative and economical methods of
producing naturally-occurring substances. Scripps purified Factor VIII:C using
conventional chemical methods and obtained a patent for the products of, and
a process for purifying and concentrating, Factor VIH:C from human"' and
porcine blood plasma.65 The Scripps patent included both product 66 and
product-by-process 67 claims.
59. See Burk, supra note 4, at 16-17.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 49, at 13-14, 323-24 (finding
government funding of biotechnology insufficient to support rapid commercialization).
62. Robin Eisner, Biotech Jobs CouldEludePostdcsandFinnsSeekExperienced Workers, 4 ScETsT
1 (1990); see also Philip J. Hilts, Plans to Speed Approval of Drugs: Makers Would Pay Fees to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, August 11, 1992, at AI (indicating that U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations contribute
significantly to delaying marketing).
63. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
modified, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), modified 724
F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
People whose bodies do not produce Factor VM:C are hemophiliacs who are exposed to the risk of
hemorrhaging from even a minor wound. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1385.
66. The product claims alleged to have been infringed by Genentech were Claim 24: "A human VIII:C
preparation having a potency in the range of 134 to 1172 units per ml. and being substantially free of
VIII:RP"; and Claim 25: "A human VIII:C preparation of claim 24, wherein the VIII:C concentration is
at least 160,000 fold purified relative to Vm:C in plasma: Id.
67. Id. A product-by-process claim is one in which a product is claimed by the process of making it,
in contrast to a product claim, in which a product is claimed by its characteristics, such as its composition,
purity, function or structure. The product-by-process claim asserted to be infringed by Genentech was Claim
13: "HighIy purified and concentrated human or porcine VnI:C prepared in accordance with the method
of claim 1." Id. Claim 1 as incorporated by reference in Claim 13 stated:
I. An improved method of preparing Factor VIII procoagulant activity protein comprising the
steps of
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Although Genentech manufactured its Factor VIII:C by recombinant
techniques, Genentech was accused of infringement on both the product and
product-by-process claims.68 The recombinant process avoided using human
plasma pools that may contain infectious agents such as HIV-1, the etiologic
agent of AIDS. In addition, the recombinant process produced Factor VIII:C
in higher purity and made large-scale production feasible. The issue was whether
a patent claim obtained on the basis of isolating and purifying the natural protein
was infringed when the same protein was produced by recombinant means.
69
Addressing the allegation of infringement of the product claims, Genentech
argued that it had not infringed for two reasons: (1) the asserted product claims
must be interpreted to apply solely to Factor VHI:C derived directly from human
blood plasma;70 and (2) since the preferred embodiment described in the
specification disclosed a process for filtering Factor VIII:C from human or
porcine plasma, the court should read this limitation into the claims.71 The trial
court refused to limit Scripps' claims to VIII:C from human plasma and to the
process Scripps taught in the patent.72 Instead, the trial court focused on the
fact that recombinant Factor VII:C is structurally and functionally the same
as Scripps' plasma-derived Factor VIII:C.7 3 The trial court granted summary
judgment on the ground that the recombinant product infringed the product
claims.74
On appeal, the Federal Circuit likewise refused to construe the product
claims to include the inherent process limitation.' As a matter of literal
construction, the recombinant product was not excluded from Scripps' product
claims.76 Genentech raised the defense that the recombinant product was so
far changed in principle that it did not infringe Scripps' product claims by virtue
(a) adsorbing a VI:C/NIII:RP complex from a plasma or commercial concentrate source
onto particles bound to a monoclonal antibody specific to VII:RP,
(b) eluting the VlIl:C,
(c) adsorbing the VIfl:C obtained in step (b) in another adsorption to concentrate and further
purify same,
(d) eluting the adsorbed VIII:C, and
(e) recovering highly purified and concentrated VII:C.
Id.
68. Genentech scientists sequenced the protein, cloned the Factor VII:C gene, cloned the cDNA by
encoding the actual coding sequence, expressed the DNA in a mammalian cell system, and devised a protein
purification process. Id. at 1384.
69. The proceedings also involved several other issues including patent validity, infringement, inducement
to infringe, and reissue law and practice. The present discussion focuses on the courts' analysis relating to
patent scope.
70. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
modified, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), modified 724
F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), afjd inpart, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1389.
72. Id. at 1389-94.
73. Id. at 1394.
74. Id. at 1395.
75. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 1580.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal
of the "reverse doctrine of equivalents."7 The court found that Genentech's
theory of reverse doctrine of equivalents raised contested issues of fact that
precluded summary judgment. Explaining that the doctrine exists "to prevent
unwarranted extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the patentee's
invention," the court reasoned that "[t]he principles of patent law must be applied
in accordance with the statutory purpose, and the issues raised by new tech-
nologies require considered analysis. ' 78 The court found the trial court's grant
of summary judgment inappropriate because "Genentech ha[d] raised questions
of scientific and evidentiary fact material to the issue of infringement." 79
Some commentators criticized the Federal Circuit court's approach in
Scripps. One argued that case law has established that a patent claim to an
ordinary chemical compound is infringed even if the alleged infringer makes
the chemical in a purity superior to that achieved using the process described
in the patent.80 This commentator found troubling the court's apparent attempt
to put biotechnology inventions into a special category: "[It is questionable
whether the same result would have been reached if the invention had been one
of conventional chemistry and, if it would not, whether the decision reflects
a sound distinction between those technologies. '1
With regard to the product-by-process claims, the trial court refused to grant
summary judgment, reasoning that since Genentech did not practice the recited
process, there could be no infringement.8 2 The Federal Circuit disagreed with
that analysis, finding that the scope of the product-by-process claims was not
limited to products prepared by the process set forth in the claims.83 No
authority was cited for that proposition. The Federal Circuit made no comment
on the applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Cochrane v. Badische
Anilin & Soda Fabrik,84 which the trial court cited in support of its conclusion
that "[a] product-by-process claim is infringed only by a product produced by
following the same process described in the claim.
85
The Scripps decision has a major impact on the scope of patent rights
obtainable by inventors who isolate proteins from natural sources vis-a-vis those
who make the same protein by recombinant technology. The decision reflects
two antagonistic results, creating possible process-related exceptions to
infringement of a product claim that, on its face, makes no reference to any
77. Id. For a discussion of the "reverse doctrine of equivalents," see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying
text.
78. Id. at 1581.
79. Id.
80. Baechtold et. al, supra note 13, at 171.
81. Id.
82. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified,
678 F Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified 707 F Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), modified 724 F. Supp.
690 (N.D. Cal. 1989). aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
83. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
84. 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
85. Scripps, 666 F Supp. at 1386-87.
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process parameters, while reading process limitations out of a claim that
expressly recites them.
D. Genentech: First Generation Invention Versus Second Generation Invention
In Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation, Ltd,86 the court determined
the scope of two Genentech patents. One patent described a method to isolate
and purify tissue-type plasminogen activator (t-PA) from cultured human
melanoma cells and included a claim to the resulting purified t-PA The
second patent described the use of genetic engineering techniques to produce
recombinant t-PA.88 The t-PA holds the promise of dissolving blood clots in
heart attack victims without causing widespread bleeding in the patient 89 Native
human t-PA is a 527 amino acid glycosylated protein divided into five domains,
each with a different function. Genentech charged that two Welcome products
infringed Genentech's patents: met-type t-PA, which differs from t-PA only in
a substitution of a different amino acid at position 245 of the t-PA protein; and
a variant of t-PA, known as FEIX, in which the amino acids in two of the five
domains have been deleted. Because of the deletion of these two domains, FEiX
has less affinity for fibrin than native t-PA. In contrast to t-PA, which has a
half-life of four minutes in the blood stream, FE1X has a half-life of forty-two
minutes. FE1X's longer half-life reduces the dosage required for effective
treatment."
The critical issue for determining the scope of Genentech's patents was the
meaning of "human plasminogen activator" in the patents. At one extreme, it
could be deemed to refer to a protein having the exact same amino acid
86. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363 (BNA) (D. Del. 1990).
87. U.S. Patent No. 4,752,603 (June 21, 1988). Claim 1 of the patent is as follows:
Human plasminogen activator, having thrombolytic properties, immunologically distinct from
urokinase and having a specific activity of about 500,000 IU/mg. using the WHO First
International Reference Preparation of t-PA (tissue plasminogen activator) as assay standard or
a specific activity of about 90,000 IU/mg. using the WHO First International Reference Preparation
of urokinase as assay standard.
88. U.S. Patent No. 4,766,075 (Aug. 3, 1988) describes genetic engineering techniques to produce a
recombinant t-PA product. The chief claims were 1, 3, and 8:
1. A DNA isolate consisting essentially of DNA sequence encoding human tissue plasminogen
activator, ....
3. A recombinant expression vector containing a DNA sequence encoding human tissue
plasminogen activator, wherein the vector is capable of expressing human tissue plasminogen
activator in a transformed microorganism or cell culture; and ....
8. A cell culture capable of expressing human tissue plasminogen activator, obtained by
transforming a mammalian cell line with a vector according to claim 3.
89. Plasminogen activator, t-PA, works by converting plasminogen into its active form, plasmin. Plasmin
then dissolves fibrin, which is the major component of blood clots. Unlike nonspecific plasminogen activators,
t-PA binds to fibrin and hence avoids the problem that the nonspecific activators have in activating
plasminogen throughout the blood stream, causing systemic degradation of blood proteins and internal
bleeding. Arthur Klausner, Researchers Probe Second-Generation t-PA, 4 Bto/TEcH. 706,708 (1986); Mark
Ramer, t-Pa Trials, Tribulations, and Litigation, 8 BIo/TEcH. 385 (1990).
90. This yields a two-fold benefit of "possibly cutting manufacturing costs" as well as "reducing the
potential for serious side-effects such as cranial bleeding." Ratner, supra note 89, at 385.
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sequence, glycosylation, and conformation as native t-PA. On the other hand,
it could be read to cover proteins having one or more biochemical activities
characteristic of t-PA, with less regard for structural similarity.
The Delaware federal district court construed the term "human plasminogen
activator" restrictively and concluded that "human plasminogen activator" could
only refer to the defined human t-PA or a naturally occurring variant.91 The
term obviously could be read more broadly.92 The court held that neither met-
type t-PA nor the second generation variant, FE1X, was human t-PA or a
naturally occurring variant and therefore there had been no literal infringement.
However, the court took a liberal interpretation of claim scope under the
doctrine of equivalents analysis. Patent infringement "may be found (but not
necessarily) if an accused device performs substantially the same overall function
or work, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same overall
result as the claimed invention."'93 Both variants of t-PA convert plasminogen
into plasmin, the enzyme that breaks down fibrin clots formed in blood vessels.
Wellcome argued that the single substitution of an amino acid in met-type t-PA
altered the secondary and tertiary protein structure,94 resulting in greater
vulnerability to proteolytic inactivation and a decrease in thermal stability.
Wellcome also contended that FE1X could not be equivalent to the native t-PA
since it does not work in the same way. FEIX had been designed by removing
two domains and therefore bound only weakly to fibrin. In contrast, Genentech
had promoted the strong fibrin-binding properties of its product.95 FEIX is
also different in that it is administered as a one-time bolus injection, rather than
the three-hour infusion required for t-PA.96 Despite these functional differences,
the court decided that any distinction between the patented t-PA and the accused
variant "hinges on the means o,AQoducing the cleavage of plasminogen to
plasmin.''97 The court labelled this distinction a material issue of fact to be
decided by the jury, which returned a verdict against Wellcome on the issue
of equivalents. 98
91. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363, 1368-70 (D. Del. 1990).
92. COOPER, supra note 18, § 5A.0616], at 5A-40.
93. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
94. A single amino acid change in a protein at a critical locus can nullify the function of the protein,
or can result in creating a new function. Scientists do not yet know enough about biological activities to
predict such changes. Margaret M. Wall & Justin Dituri, The En Banc Rehearing of In re Dillon: Policy
Considerations and Implications For Patent Prosecution, 68 DENV. U. L. REV. 261,272 (199 1) ("[R]elative
unpredictability in some aspects of biotechnology is due to the fact that small variations in structure may
or may not result in significant changes in biological function.") (citation omitted).
95. Ratner, supra note 89, at 385.
96. Id.
97. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363, 1370 (BNA) (D. Del. 1990).
98. t-PA Variants are Equivalent to Genentech's Patented t-PA, 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) No. 977, at 503 (April 19, 1990). This decision ended Wellcome's six-year research effort to
improve t-PA. Ratner, supra note 89, at 387 ("The anti-competitive effect of such a verdict, therefore, is
worrisome.").
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In the equivalents analysis, the court's focus on the "means" by which the
two products cleave plasminogen shows a lack of understanding of biotech-
nological science. The court's focus on "means" poses two problems. First,
application of the doctrine of equivalents is straightforward when the relationship
between structure and function is well defined, as in most mechanical devices,
or when the chemical equivalents can be understood through well-accepted
principles of reaction mechanism or physical properties. However, the structure-
function relationships in biotechnology are not well understood. 99 Two proteins
very similar in structure can unexpectedly function drastically differently. Second,
it is very difficult to demonstrate to the trier of fact exactly how the biotech-
nological inventions function, because they occur within complex processes in
living things and involve mechanisms about which we understand very little.
In the face of these difficulties, the trier of fact may reduce the test of
equivalents to a mere examination of observable end results produced by the
accused embodiment. Here the court's decision reduced the comparison of the
two products to the fact that "they both cleave plasminogen to plasmin."
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVES AND PATENT SCOPE
Having explored the nature of biotechnological science and the courts'
analysis of disputes both between recombinant and natural protein manufacturers
and between first and second generation recombinant technology producers in
Part II, this Note now expands on Part I's discussion of the effect of patent scope
on progress in biotechnology. This Part examines in detail four economic theories
explaining how patents promote technological progress: the incentive-to-invent
theory, the incentive-to-disclose theory, the incentive-to-innovate theory, and
the prospect theory.
A. Incentive-to-Invent Theory
The incentive-to-invent theory recognizes that an inventor demands
compensation for his investment in research and development.l ° Absent
government subsidies or awards, an inventor makes a profit on his invention
in the market. However, these profits disappear if free-riders can quickly copy
the invention. Competition drives prices down to marginal cost, at which point
the inventor recovers manufacturing costs but receives no return for his original
99. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
100. See WARDS. BOWMiAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 2-3 (1973); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation ofResourcesfor Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIvE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Universities-National Bureau Comm. for Economic Research and the
Comm. on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council ed., 1962); John S. McGee, Patent
Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J.L. & ECON. 135 (1966); Richard R. Nelson, The
Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature, 32 J. Bus. 101 (1959).
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investment in research and development." 1 As a result, if competition prevents
the inventor from recouping his investment, his incentive to invent vanishes. 2
Lack of protection from such competition may significantly delay socially
beneficial inventions, or prevent them entirely.
The incentive-to-invent theory holds that patent protection, by providing
the inventor an exclusive right to make, use, and sell his invention, 03 insulates
the inventor from competition. The inventor can charge a monopoly price to
recover his research and development investment. This price reflects the value
to the invention's users rather than the mere cost of production.'
°4
Several economists challenge the incentive-to-invent theory. First, the theory
rests on the dubious assumption that the invention would not exist but for the
efforts of the inventor who patented it. If another inventor might have produced
the invention, a grant of monopoly power to the first inventor may be
inappropriate.'05
Second, subjecting new inventions to monopoly control restricts their use
and thereby reduces the social benefits they provide. Granting patent monopolies
to restrict output or to raise prices may prove unnecessary for stimulating
invention. Alternative incentives to invest in research, such as the first-mover
advantage"0 6 and competition with technological rivals, may be sufficient. 0 7
Similarly, nonpatent barriers to market entry may deter competition sufficiently
to make research and development profitable without patents.'08
Finally, some writers have argued that patents hinder progress because they
may undermine the incentive of other researchers to make improvements in the
patented technology.'09 Once an invention is patented, only the patent holder
and his licensees can profit from the research that refines the invention; the
absence of patent protection would allow competitors the chance to profit as
well and therefore stimulate them to research for improvements of the patented
invention. Patents not only deter competitors from researching improvements
101. Research and development costs include the costs of inventing the product or process, of enabling
commercialization by large scale manufacturing, of gaining FDA approval, and of modifying the product
or process to satisfy consumer taste.
102. See FREDERICK M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
444 (2nd ed. 1980); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 268-69 (1966).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
104. Baxter, supra note 102, at 270.
105. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 100, at 17. Some commentators argue that inventions arise inevitably
with or without patents when the state of basic knowledge and other social conditions become favorable.
S. C. GLFILLAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF INVENTIONS 71-78 (1935).
106. SCHERER, supra note 102, at 444-45.
107. Id. at 445-46.
108. See, e.g., id. at 446-47. Examples of nonpatent barriers include production facilities, managerial
experience, and distribution channels. Id. at 447.
109. See, e.g., id. at 452. For example, James Watt, owner of the steam engine patent, saw little value
in high-pressure engines. Watts denied researchers who were interested in developing the high-pressure engine
access to his steam engine technology, which was essential to the new research. This hindrance may have
delayed the introduction of steam locomotives and steamboats. Id.
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on the invention but also may cause wasted time and effort as competitors, to
avoid infringement, search for redundant solutions to technological problems
already solved.'
1. Implications for Patent Scope
Under the incentive-to-invent theory, patents permit inventors to reap returns
on their inventions sufficient to recover investment in research and development.
To reach this goal, patent scope must be broad enough to recompense the cost
of invention. On the other hand, patent scope should not extend further than
necessary to accomplish this objective, because patents restrict distribution of
the invention and reduce incentives for others to make improvements. Broad
patent scope therefore reduces the social benefits of patented inventions."'
If, as the critics assert, alternative incentives to invent remain despite the absence
of patent rewards, or if nonpatent barriers provide sufficient protection to the
inventor in the market, efficiency dictates narrower patent scopes.
2. Alternative Incentives to Invent in Biotechnology
One common alternative to patent protection, the race for scientific
discovery, often motivates inventors." 2 Government, special interest groups,
and industry fund academics engaged in research. These financial supports free
academics from the need to justify their inventions on a profit basis. However,
the spheres of discovery for academic and industrial researchers rarely overlap.
In contrast to industrial research, directed toward practicality and marketability,
academic research typically seeks solely the expansion of human knowledge." 3
110. Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L REv. 450,455 (1969).
However, judicial opinions often view the incentive to invent around patents as a positive benefit of the
patent system because this incentive stimulates further research. See, e.g., Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA,
Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Some commentators likewise argue that inventing around patents
is not necessarily socially wasteful if the research leads to the development of superior products or processes.
BOWMAN, supra note 100, at 21-22.
!1I. Scope determination demands accommodating the desires of two parties: the inventor and society.
The inventor will invent if the profits from his invention equal or exceed the costs. Society will grant patent
protection to an invention equal to or less than the value society attributes to the invention. If the invention's
value to society falls short of the cost of inventing, granting the patent makes no economic sense.
112. Scientist are often motivated by recognition and esteem. Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure
of Science, in THE SOCIOLoGY OF SCIENCE 270 (1973).
113. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L REV. 1017, 1017-18 (1989 (discussing distinction between basic and applied research);
see generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 133-207 (1988) (providing comprehensive
account of basic research and commercialization of inventions in different fields). For example, in 1975,
publicly funded researchers invented the technology to fuse a cancer cell with antibody-producing cells to
create a hybrid that conserves not only the capacity to secrete a particular type of antibody but also the
immortal character of cancerous cells. See Michael MacKenzie et al., The Commercial Application of a
Scienific Discovery: The Case of the Hybridoma Technique, 17 REs. POL'Y 155 (1988). Although the
inventors noted the commercial and industrial potential of their discovery, they neither patented their invention
nor polished it for commercial use. Id. at 155 n.1. Biotechnology companies did not explore commercial
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Nonetheless, the distinction between results or products of basic and applied
research is blurred in biotechnology. Modern techniques in biotechnology have
"accelerated the commercial development of basic research discoveries and
attracted commercial interest in academic biomedical research in its early
stages."' 4 Biotechnology firms and academia have formed hundreds of
strategic alliances.'"5 Although basic research conducted in universities can
never completely substitute for industrial inventions, narrowing patent scope
for biotechnology makes sense, because alternatives to financial reward may
be sufficient to stimulate inventions.
3. Nonpatent Barriers to Ensure Recovery of Research and Development
Cost
Critics of the incentive-to-invent theory also argue for narrowing patent
scopes if inventors can otherwise capture sufficient market share to recoup their
research and development costs. Typical nonpatent means of appropriation
include head start, trade secrets, sales, and service efforts." 6 Although these
factors present strong nonpatent barriers to market entry in some industries,
117
biotechnology cannot rely on these nonpatent barriers alone. Thus far,
recombinant technology chiefly produces proteins with medical value. Trade
secrets do not protect these products, because commercial exploitation necessarily
discloses the product's composition. A competitor can easily discover the amino
acid sequence of the protein since large quantities of the pure product are now
available for detailed inspection and analysis." 8 This accessibility eases
competitors' effort to copy or improve the invention." 9
Likewise, head start and sales and service efforts are unreliable nonpatent
barriers in the biotechnology industry. Typically, the inventor can secure a
significant head start by preparing its production facilities, leading to early
production and development of marketing channels. However, the head start
advantage is not very significant in the biotechnology industry because
biotechnology scale-up operations are relatively small, requiring little capital
investment. The large number of small biotechnology firms demonstrates that
development of the hybridoma technique until the early 1980's. See id. at 162-68.
114. Eisenberg, supra note 113, at 1018; see also MacKenzie, supra note 113, at 169.
115. Mark D. Dibner et al., Who's the Competition in Biotech?, 8 BlotrECH. 920, 922 (1990); see also
MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 55-72 (1986).
116. See RICHARD C. LEVIN ET AL., APPROPRIATING THE RETURNS FROM INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT 794 (Cowles Found. Paper No. 714, 1989).
117. Id.
118. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
119. Trade secrets have proven effective only with regard to product innovation that incorporates various
technological barriers to analysis or with regard to process innovations that can be hidden from public view.
VON HIPPEL, supra note 113, at 54; see also Wall & Dituri, supra note 94, at 274 (1991) ("[Miany
biotechnology inventions cannot be adequately protected as trade secrets.").
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start-up costs do not pose a significant barrier to market entry.' Advertising,
sales and service efforts are often undertaken to develop consumer familiarity
and goodwill, both of which increase producers' market shares. However,
consumer familiarity and goodwill hold less sway over the consumers of
biotechnology, who are a few sophisticated research institutes and medical
specialists who select products on the basis of technical knowledge rather than
familiarity alone.
4. Summary
The incentive-to-invent theory suggests that in order both to stimulate
inventive activities and to minimize the undesirable output-restricting effect of
patents, patent scope should be just broad enough to allow the inventor to recover
the cost of the inventions. Since nonprofit, academic research contributes
significantly to inventions in the field, biotechnology patent scope can be further
narrowed. However, biotechnology patents should not be narrowed simply on
the assumption that inventors have nonpatent means to ensure their ability to
appropriate a return.
While the incentive-to-invent theory illuminates the general discussion on
biotechnology patent scope, it gives no guidance to the question of patent scope
from an alleged infringer's perspective. This theory has little to offer in resolving
the issues that Scripps121 and Genentech122 present, that is, whether a patent
on a protein isolated from natural sources should cover the same protein made
by recombinant technology, and whether a patent on a recombinant protein
should protect variations and improvements of that protein.
B. Incentive-to-Disclose Theory
The incentive-to-disclose theory holds that, without patent protection,
inventors would conceal their inventions in order to prevent exploitation by
competitors.' 23 Concealment deprives the public of a full range of benefits:
wider distribution, alternative uses and price-cutting competition for the market.
Secrecy can also lead to waste to the extent that competitors duplicate
120. As of June 1990, there were more than 300 biotechnology companies. Of these, 185 were publicly
traded, representing a market capital of $7 to 8 billion. Role of Patents in Biotechnology is the Focus of
Two Conferences, 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 987, at 211 (June 28, 1990).
121. Scripps Clinic& Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified,
678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modified, 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), modfied, 724 F. Supp.
690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For a
discussion, see text accompanying notes 63-85.
122. Genentech, Inc. v. Welcome Found. Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363 (BNA) (D. Del. 1990). For a
discussion, see text accompanying notes 86-99.
123. SCHERER, supra note 102, at 440; BOWMAN, supra note 100, at 12-13.
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research.124 This theory contains several potential flaws, because patents may
not necessarily promote disclosure of inventions that would otherwise remain
secret.' 25 First, secrecy may not be a viable option. Secrecy can prove
impractical for protecting inventions," 6 as competitors can eventually uncover
secret technologies through reverse engineering.127 Moreover, were long-term
secrecy possible, inventors would eschew the patent's limited, seventeen-year
protection. Critics also question whether patent disclosures inform the public
sufficiently to disperse this new knowledge."n Such criticisms undermine the
proposition that patents promote disclosure through rewards to inventors.
Despite these criticisms, patents create legal rights that permit disclosure,
enabling sales negotiations or licensing of the patented product or tech-
nology. 129 Secrecy complicates the sale or licensing of inventions for commer-
cial development or marketing, because potential purchasers will not pay for
an idea without first understanding the invention. Yet, after disclosure, without
a legal right in the invention, the inventor has nothing left to sell. The patent
system solves this problem by permitting inventors to disclose their patented
inventions to potential users without losing their exclusive rights. The patent
holder may sue unauthorized users for infringement. 30 Patents thus discourage
secrecy and wasteful duplicative research while increasing the public's access
to valuable information.
1. Implications for Patent Scope
The incentive-to-disclose theory suggests that the scope of a patent should
cover the range of products or processes the public could make relying on the
information the patent discloses. That is, patent scope should cover not only
the disclosed invention, but also variations one skilled in the art could make
given the teaching. This interpretation finds direct and concrete support in
statutes and doctrines of patent scope. To begin with, Congress requires patents
to describe the embodiment in sufficient detail to enable any person skilled in
the art to make and use the invention 3' without undue experimentation.
3 2
124. Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing,
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 982 (1977).
125. See., e.g., SCHERER, supra note 102, at 441.
126. BOWMAN, supra note 100, at 13.
127. Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patentsfor Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30,44 (1934).
On a lower technology level, departing employees may simply steal the technology or sell their knowledge
to competitors. SCHERER, supra note 102, at 441.
128. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 89 (1969) ("It is well known that a firm tries not to disclose key parts of the
invention in order to reduce the chance of imitation, thereby reducing the effective diffusion of knowledge.").
129. Arrow, supra note 100, at 615.
130. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271 (a), 281 (1988).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) requires the patentee to provide an enabling disclosure:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
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In addition, courts must interpret the claims in the context of the "specification,
the prosecution history, and the other claims." '133 The specification, in particu-
lar, guides courts both as to the meaning of the particular terms the claims
use,13 and in understanding the invention itself. Furthermore, courts require
the scope of enablement to match the scope of the claims. 135 That is, courts
ask whether "the scope of enablement provided to one of ordinary skill in the
art by the disclosure [in the patent] is such as to be commensurate with the scope
of protection sought by the claims. 136
For example, courts generally grant narrower scope to chemical patents than
to mechanical patents.137 Adjustments to mechanical inventions produce
predictable consequences. Conversely, a chemical patent's specification teaches
little about how varying the chemical's structure or reactive conditions would
alter its effects. 38 To explain the less expansive protection they accord
chemical arts, courts reason that the breadth of claims a patent's disclosure
supports "varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors
involved.' 39
2. Applying the Theory to Biotechnology
Many biotechnology patents have earned Patent and Trademark Office
approval despite the limited disclosure supporting their broad claims.' 40
Examples include claims to any DNA sequence that codes for a certain protein
when only one such sequence is disclosed, claims for certain proteins and analogs
thereof with certain biological activity when only a few analogs are disclosed,
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same ....
132. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted) ("That some experimentation is necessary does not preclude enablement; the amount of
experimentation, however, must not be unduly extensive.").
133. Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1027 (1988); see also Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
134. See, e.g., Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Fonar Corp.,
821 F.2d at 632.
135. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
136. In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
137. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
138. In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
139. Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.,708 F. Supp. 1096,1107 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (summary
judgment of noninfringement granted), affd in part, vacated in part, 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert.
dismissed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1991) (No. 90-1052) (quoting In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839
(C.C.P.A. 1970)).
140. See Robert A. Armitage, The Emerging US PatentLawfor the Protection ofBiotechnology Research
Results, 2 EUR. INThLL PROP. REV. 47, 57 (1989) ("The emerging law in the United States suggests that
broad and effective protection will be afforded to inventors. ... The US ... issue[s] dominant product patents
with broad claims"); Edward T. Lentz, Adequacy of Disclosures ofBiotechnology Inventions, 16 AM. INTELL.
PROP. L. Ass'N Q.J. 314, 318 (1989) ("Claims to biotechnology inventions seem uncommonly broad in
comparison to typical chemical cases .... ").
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and claims to DNA expression in all organisms when expression in a single
host alone is disclosed. 4
Courts and scientists agree that variations on biotechnological inventions
yield unpredictable results. 42 Therefore, the enablement theory supports
narrowing claims to only those products or processes discoverable within the
limited circle of predictability that the state of biotechnological research permits.
3. Application of the Incentive-to-Disclose Theory to Scripps and
Genentech
The incentive-to-disclose theory contradicts the holdings of both Scripps
and Genentech. In Scripps, the court found that Scripps' patent teaching
extraction and isolation of the Factor VIII:C protein was infringed by Genen-
tech's recombinant protein. 43 First, the court refused to limit Scripps' patent
for protein Factor VIII:C to proteins isolated from blood plasma, although the
patent's products claim did not teach those skilled in the art how to make the
same protein by recombinant methods. Second, the court refused to limit Scripps'
product-by-process claims to proteins derived by the conventional isolation and
extraction method. 44 The Scripps court's ruling contradicts the incentive-to-
disclose theory's justification for patents. That theory holds that patent scope
of a protein made with conventional methods should not be extended to include
the recombinant protein, since the patent on the conventional protein in no way
teaches one skilled in the art to make the recombinant protein.
The Genentech court's approach also conflicts with the incentive-to-disclose
theory. In Genentech, the court invited the jury to examine whether the doctrine
of equivalents protected claims of the t-PA protein against alleged infringement
by an improved version of the protein, FE1X. However, the court focused on
the means by which the two proteins cleave plasminogen into plasmin. This
focus on the means through which the two proteins function is inconsistent with
the incentive-to-disclose theory's emphasis on what the invention actually teaches
and enables those skilled in the art to produce.
141. See Lentz, supra note 140, for examples of such claims as they appear in biotechnology patents.
142. See, e.g., Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 548 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1986)
("[E]xperiments in genetic engineering produce, at best, unpredictable results."); Exparte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q.
196, 200 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1985); see also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text; C. T. TAYLOR
& Z. A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRrriSH EXTERIENCE
252 (1973) ("[Uinpredictability [of the behavior of chemicals in the human body] is of a much higher order
than that found in non-biological areas of chemical research-and very much higher than that in engineering
fields.").
143. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 82-85.
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C. The Incentive-to-Innovate/Schumpeterian Theory
The incentive-to-innovate theory recognizes that inventions may require
considerable further investment beyond mere discovery for commercial
exploitation. 145 Commercial feasibility may demand further research and
development, and large-scale development may necessitate the construction of
new plants and equipment. A new invention may require refinements to suit
the tastes of consumers, as well as advertising to persuade consumers to buy
it. "Innovation" denotes these necessary steps between inventing a product or
process and bringing it to market.' 46
Joseph Schumpeter was first to distinguish innovation from invention.' 47
Schumpeter noted that the invention itself produces "no economically relevant
effect at all."' 48 Innovation, on the other hand, engenders revolutionary changes
in the economic system through "a process of Creative Destruction."1 49 In
this process, new firms continually arise to exploit new innovations, driving
out old firms that provide obsolete goods and services. Schumpeter argued that
in this dynamic model of the capitalist system, patent monopoly promotes
innovation and growth more effectively than pure competition. Schumpeter based
his view on the observation that economic advances are more frequently traced
to big monopolistic businesses than to firms in atomistically competitive
industries. 5 ' He also reasoned that protection from competition allows firms
time and space for further developments. More importantly, the prospect of
extraordinary returns permits innovators to induce investment and to lure away
productive resources from other uses."' A monopoly secured through patent
protection could thus increase, rather than restrict, the use of an invention by
facilitating its commercial introduction by innovating firms. Schumpeter therefore
maintained the necessity of patent monopolies to induce investment in "innovation."
52
145. See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 102, at 441.
146. See, e.g., id.; Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Study No. 15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (GPO
1958).
147. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-110 (3rd ed. 1950)
[hereinafter SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM]; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 1 BUSINESS CYCLES 84-192 (1939)
[hereinafter SCHUMPETER, BUSINESs CYCLES].
148. SCHJMPETeR, BUSINEss CYCLES, supra note 147, at 84.
149. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, supra note 147, at 83.
150. Id. at 82.
151. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 67-74 (1983).
152. Like the incentive-to-invent and incentive-to-disclose theories, the incentive-to-innovate theory
holds that the patent system offers monopoly profits to promote desired behavior. But it differs from these
other theories regarding the point at which the incentive operates. The incentive-to-invent and incentive-to-
disclose theories assume that the patent monopoly has already served its social function of promoting invention
and disclosure as soon as the patent issues, and that enforcement of the patent thereafter merely constitutes
the social cost of fulfilling the bargain. Reducing the scope of existing patents would thus offer short-term
social benefits by increasing the use of previously patented inventions, although in the long run it would
reduce incentives to make and disclose new inventions. In contrast, the incentive-to-innovate theory gives
existing patents an on-going role in preserving the incentives of patent holders to invest in development
during the patent term.
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Empirical studies testing Schumpeter's assumption-that monopolistic
conditions created by patents more readily induce innovation than do competitive
conditions-have proved inconclusive. 153 One commentator, Eric von Hippel,
attacked this assumption through a study on the sources of innovation.
154
According to von Hippel, the original inventors do not necessarily innovate.
Whether users, suppliers, or others develop innovations varies with the different
technological fields. Firms expecting the greatest return from the innovation
are typically first to develop it. Therefore, granting a patent monopoly to the
inventor would not necessarily motivate innovation based on that invention.
However, Schumpeter's notion that monopoly surpasses competition in
stimulating innovation finds support in biotechnology.155 The ability of small
biotechnology firms with patents that give them a monopoly over important
products or processes to outstrip the large traditional pharmaceutical companies
comports with Schumpeterian's concept of "Creative Destruction." The traditional
phamarceutical companies, despite their superior innovative resources, lag far
behind the small start-up companies in contributing to biotechnological
innovations.
The Schumpeterian argument offers little guidance in determining the proper
scope of patent claims. This theory emphasizes that scope determination should
take the difficulty and cost of innovation into account. However, like the
incentive-to-invent theory, it offers little insight in deciding the scope of a patent
vis-A-vis an alleged infringer's interest.
D. The Prospect Theory
According to the prospect theory,156 patents promote efficient development
153. FREDERICK M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 169-255
(1984); SCHERER, supra note 102, at 423-24.
154. VON HIPPEL, supra note 113, at 11-42.
155. See Martin Kenney, Schumpeterian Innovation and Entrepreneurs in Capitalism: A Case Study
of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 15 RES. POL'Y 21, 21 (1988) ("The role of small biotechnology firms
in reducing these innovations to practice and in their ability to continue to grow demonstrates that the
independent entrepreneur. .. has been very active in the biotechnology industry.").
156. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267-71
(1977). Kitch created the term "prospect theory" to describe an analogy between functions of patent
monopolies and awards of exclusive mineral claims in government-owned lands in the American West. This
theory offers a justification for patents in keeping with broader theories of property rights elaborated by
Harold Demsetz and Richard Posner. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at 27-31 (2d ed.
1977); Demsetz, supra note 30, at 347. Demsetz and Posner argue that in contrast with communal ownership,
private property rights promote more efficient use of resources. individuals tend to exploit communally owned
resources too quickly in order to appropriate the resources for themselves, before the resources are depleted
by other community members. The result is an exhaustion of resources by individuals in the present with
the externalities born by the community as a whole in the future. Private ownership corrects this problem
by placing property owners in a position to bear the full costs as well as the benefits of exploitation, thereby
internalizing what would otherwise be external costs in a system of communal ownership.
Kitch analogizes patents to the depletable property discussed by Demsetz and Posner. Kitch clarifies
the analogy, noting that while information embodied in patents is not depletable by use, resources are needed
to use the information and are scarce. Property rights in inventions ultimately improve the efficiency with
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of patented inventions by allowing patent owners to coordinate further research
and development efforts. If the patent owner holds the exclusive right to exploit
and to improve the technology defined in the patent claims, others will not invest
in improving this technology without prior arrangements with the patent owner.
Otherwise, an improvement infringing the patent will provoke legal
sanctions. 157 Therefore, the patent owner can force researchers to share
information, thereby avoiding duplicative research efforts. 158 In the absence
of patents, independent attempts to develop the same variation or improvement
of the invention would lack the benefit of the knowledge gained through others'
efforts.
Critics of the prospect theory believe that competitive rivalry for the patent
offsets the efficiency gained through coordination. Patents do not eliminate the
inefficiency of competition, but rather shift the competition back one stage, since
there is no pre-patent right to a patent.159 Moreover, critics question whether
granting broad scope to an initial inventor induces more effective development
and future invention. These critics argue that eliminating rivalry induces
complacency since it also "diminishes the threatened costs of inaction.,'1
60
Moreover, firms' limited "cognitive capacity" creates a "tendency to focus on
past experience. '1 61 Once a firm reaches competence in one part of a "pros-
pect," it may ignore other potential advances apparent to other firms.
62
However, these firms may still achieve the efficiency of coordination if the patent
holder brings in talented individuals to develop selected areas using selective
licensing, which does not increase real competition. However, tailoring licenses
to particular licensees entails high transaction costs.
163
1. Implications for Patent Scope
In order to eliminate inefficient competition and to achieve efficient
coordinated research, the prospect theory opposes the limitation of patent scopes
to the version of the invention as described in the patent. Rather, this theory
proposes extending the patent to subsequent refinements as well. Even if others'
further research produces improved versions, the patent owner will still control
all versions until the patent expires.
which these resources are managed. Kitch, supra, at 275-76.
157. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 281 (1988).
158. Kitch, supra note 156, at 276-79.
159. See Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A
Comment, 23 J.L & EcoN. 197 (1980).
160. Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 872.
161. Id. at 873.
162. Id.
163. See Richard Caves, et al., The ImperfectMarketfor Technology Licenses, 45 OXFoRD BULL ECON.
& STAT. 249, 260-62 (1983); Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 875 ('We have not found a single case
where the holder of a broad patent used it effectively through tailored licensing to coordinate the R&D of
others.").
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Patent law doctrine supports this notion to some degree. Though the accused
product or process does not literally infringe a claim, the "doctrine of
equivalents" finds infringement when the device is essentially the same as the
one patented."64 Consistent with the notion of facilitating coordination, courts
determined the width of "equivalents" based on the patented invention's advance
beyond the prior art. When the patent is a "mere improvement" over the prior
art, courts tend not to consider "equivalent" a product or process even if it is
only marginally beyond the patent claims.16 5 After all, there is not much
coordination to be gained if the patentee's invention is a small improvement.
On the other hand, a "pioneer" invention-which the Supreme Court has defined
as "a patent covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device,
or one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress
of the art' 66 -is "entitled to a broad range of equivalents.' 67 Nonetheless,
this range of equivalents is limited in that infringement under the "doctrine of
equivalents" requires substantial identity in the "function performed, means by
which [that] function is performed, and [the] result achieved., 168 A pioneer
patent is not infringed by a device if it achieves a different result, or achieves
it in a different way. 169 This doctrine has been applied to find infringement
of patented inventions by subsequent improvements that are unforeseen at the
time of the patent.170 Again, this application of the doctrine supports the
164. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). However, courts
have never explicitly related the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents to benefits of coordinating future
research.
165. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004
(1985). Of course, in addition to looking at how far the patented invention improved the prior art, courts
also examine how similar the accused device is to the patented invention. If the accused device shows only
minor or "insubstantial" variation in one part or a minor change in structure, infringement will be found
even if the patentee's variation is a"mere improvement." Weidman Metal Masters Co. v. Glass Master Corp.,
623 F2d 1024, 1030 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981). See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding equivalents cannot be used to
encompass more than "insubstantial change").
166. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898). Another test of pioneer
status is whether the patent led to a new branch of industry. See, e.g., Ludium Steel Co. v. Terry, 37 F.2d
153, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 1928). It seems that Kitch's notion of "prospect" is not as restrictive as these definitions.
For Kitch, a "prospect" need not represent a significant step to advance the art, but need only to have created
room for further development. Kitch, supra note 156, at 268-69, 278-79.
167. 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTs: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT § 18.04[2] (1992). Inventions falling somewhere between the two extremes are given an
intermediate range of equivalents. Id. § 18.0412], at 18-12.
168. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Mich., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis
omitted).
169. Mead Digital Sys., Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., 723 F.2d 455, 464 (6th Cir. 1983).
170. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[P]artial variation
in technique, an embellishment made possible by post-[patent] technology, does not allow the accused
spacecraft to escape the 'web of infringement."'); Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d
866, 873-74 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974) (patented method for laying pipes that uses
a beam of light to align pipe segment was held to be infringed by more sophisticated pipe laying methods
made possible by later developed laser beam technology.). But see Texas Instruments, Inc., v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 E2d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[T]he total of the technological changes beyond
what the [patent] disclosed transcends ... equitable limits ... and propels the accused devices beyond a
just scope [for the original patent].").
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prospect theory's notion that patent scope should be extended only so far as
coordination will be gained. If a subsequent improvement is completely
unforeseeable, then there is no coordination possible and patent scope should
not be extended to that improvement.
2. The Prospect Theory Applied to Biotechnology
The prospect theory favors broad patent scope for inventions in order to
allow coordination of subsequent research. If such coordination is not possible,
the claim for broad scope fails. Even ignoring the twin dangers of inaction'
71
and the cognitive limitation of a firm coordinating research, 172 the prospect
theory applies poorly to biotechnology. Biotechnology's unpredictability 73
confounds the prospect theory's central notion of coordination. As long as the
subsequent research the patent holder monitors and controls remains routine
trial and error, efficiency gains from coordination probably outweigh any loss
in individual productivity that impediments to creativity and initiative in
coordinate research impose. However, the ability to coordinate depends on the
predictability of the science. Because no one can predict the next step in
biotechnological development, the benefits from coordination may be nil. 174
3. Application to Scripps and Genentech
This brief analysis of the prospect theory suggests the drawbacks of broad
protection for biotechnology patents. In particular, the prospect theory justifies
a holding of patent infringement by an improvement which is a predictable "next
step" from the original patented invention and which the original inventor could
have coordinated. In Scripps, the court did not attempt to expand the patent scope
with the doctrine of equivalents. The Genentech court, however, invoked the
doctrine of equivalents after a finding that FEiX was outside the claims of the
patent.175 The prospect theory analysis suggests that the court in Genentech
should inquire whether FE1X was a predictable improvement of t-PA rather
than merely focusing on how the two proteins achieve their functions, namely
cleaving plasminogen to dissolve blood clots. Although whether FEIX was a
predictable improvement of t-PA is not easily resolvable, this inquiry at the very
171. Even for easy improvements, coordinative efficiency may not exist because the original patent
holder has little incentive to expedite improvements unless improvements would lead to higher sales volume.
172. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 52-54, 56-58, 142 and accompanying text.
174. The patent owner on a broad prospect "need not attempt to control the development of that prospect
in any detail." Instead, the owner "could license widely and collect royalties.... But if used this way, the
grant of a broad prospect cannot be justified on the grounds [of the prospect theory]." Owners of broad patents
would not be operating as coordinators, "and the subsequent development of prospects would proceed in
spite of, or at least in indifference to, the broad patent." Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 907.
175. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363, 1370 (BNA) (D. Del. 1990).
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least directs the debate in a direction consistent with the prospect theory's goal
of coordinative efficiency.
IV. CONCLUSION
Biotechnology issues a new challenge to the courts and Congress to effect
the constitutional mandate "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts. 176 But courts, as well as commentators, seem to have lost sight of the
ultimate purpose of patent awards-promoting technological progress. Courts
have determined biotechnology patent scope by strictly applying patent doctrines
developed for mechanical and chemical arts. Similarly, commentators have
focused on whether traditional patent doctrines have been applied "correctly"
or "incorrectly." Such a focus is misguided. Traditional patent doctrine,
developed as it was for traditional industries, does not necessarily achieve its
purpose-the promotion of technological progress-when applied to industries,
such as biotechnology, in which research is characterized by unpredictability
and randomness. Instead, traditional patent doctrine should be updated to
accommodate the new economic and scientific realities of modem technological
innovation. In particular, patent scope definitions, the aspect of patent law that
essentially dictates economic incentives, should be fashioned to encourage private
parties to invent new products and processes, to disseminate knowledge, to
innovate, and to accelerate progress and avert duplicative effort by promoting
coordination among researchers. "Correct" or "incorrect" application of traditional
patent doctrines does not, as courts and commentators have suggested, dictate
the proper scope of patent protection for biotechnological inventions. The proper
scope is that which best promotes technological progress.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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